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Stewart: The Case of the Prenatal Injury
NOTES
18.

Do you know of any reason why you can not serve as a juror?
If so, state reason fully under remarks.
Remarks:
I certify that the foregoing statements
are true to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
Signature

THE CASE OF THE PRENATAL INJURY'
Anglo-American law has long been solicitous of an unborn child's
property rights.' However, only recently has this solicitude been extended to protect unborn infants against physical injury. Prenatal
injuries give rise to two basic causes of action: one, a tort action in
which the injured child himself seeks to recover for injuries sustained

before birth; the other, a wrongful death action in which statutory
beneficiaries seek to recover for losses resulting from the infant's death.
These actions have suffered a tortured development; whether these
actions will be allowed is undecided in Florida as well as a number
of other jurisdictions. Even where the basic right has been affirmatively sanctioned many problems still exist, for the extent of that

right is indefinite. The wrongful death action, particularly, is in a
confused state. The wrongful death situation in Florida could become especially complicated because five possible causes of action may
2
exist for one wrongful act.
Allowing these actions also raises a multitude of collateral prob-

lems. Of particular importance is the effect of the new cause of action
on the mother's well-established right to compensation for her own
0 A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this note.
1. "[A]n infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother's womb, is supposed in
law to be born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender
of a copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is
enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually born." I BLACKSTONE, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 130
(1765). A child en ventre sa mere is capable of taking by will. Tomlin v. Laws,
301 Ill.
616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922). A posthumous child is regarded as in being from
the moment of conception for purposes of inheritance. Hall v. Hancock, 15 Pick.
255, 26 Am. Dec. 598 (Mass. 1834). Also, one is guilty of homicide for inflicting
fatal injuries to an unborn child. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898).
2. See subheading "Death Actions," infra.
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injuries3 In theory, there would seem to be little difficulty in separating the child's damages from the mother's, but drawing this line was
part of the reason for at least one court's denying recovery for
wrongful death of the child.4 A second problem posed by the modern
decisions in the prenatal tort area is the possibility of an action by
the child against his negligent mother. The historic doctrine of
intra-family tort immunity, together with prohibition against recovery
for prenatal injuries, has barred any such action; but with the recent
trends in both areas, the problem is due for some long-needed reconsideration. 5 Another area of collateral interest involves injury
to a person's reproductive ability and the appropriate measure of
damage if such a remedy is allowed.6 It seems only a matter of time
until a right is asserted to recover for the loss of prospective children
due to tortious termination of reproductive ability. Finally, the effect
of the prenatal remedy upon the medical profession will necessarily
be significant. The increased possibility of malpractice actions may
force some practitioners to improve their practices further to bring
them into line with newly emerging standards of care.This note reviews the historical impediments to prenatal actions,
and the judicial evolution of the new rule in both tort and wrongful
death contexts. Against this background, current Florida law is ex3. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315 (1899); Berg v. New York
Soc'y for Relief of the Ruptured and Crippled, 136 N.Y.S.2d 528 (195.1). The result
of the landmark decision, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14.
17, 52 Am. Rep. 242, 245 (1884), was predicated on the mother's right of action.
"[A]s the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of the injury, anx
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was recoverable
by her ..
" This right of action has been expressly sanctioned in Florida. See
Ephrem v. Phillips, infra, note 97 and accompanying text.
4. "Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an
unborn child . . . it is apparent that practically everything that could be recovered
in an action for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered by the mother
in connection with her own claim for general damages." Norman v. Murphy, 124
Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 268 P.2d 178, 180 (1954).
5. "In recent years there have been some significant changes concerning the
right of one family member to recover from another for a personal tort committed
within the family relation. The familiar rule which once dogmatically barred such
actions . . . has been seriously eroded." Comment, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152 (1961). See
Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181 (Civ. Ct. Rec. 1958), in which the
immunity doctrine was partially set aside. A note in 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 171.
advocates total abrogation of the immunity rule as the most logical course of action.
See Comment, 14 ARK. L. REV. 92 (1959).
6. There is strong possibility that injury to the pregnant mother may well
affect her future ability to bear children. With the increased use of atomic energy
and its attendant dangers, the frequency of such injury will probably increase.
The question is posed: In such cases, should the prospective family be a proper
element of damages or is it too speculative for measurement?
7. See Note, I10 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 581 (1962).
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amined; and an assessment is made of the alternatives potentially
available to the surviving child, or the statutory beneficiaries in the
case of wrongful death, should Florida follow recent authority. Finally,
some remedial suggestions are made looking toward a solution of the
wrongful death situation in Florida.
THE R ULE AGAINST RECOVERY

Judicial recognition of a right of action for prenatal injury is a
comparatively recent development. Until 1946, the American courts
had uniformly denied recovery in all prenatal injury cases.8 This unwavering pronouncement was grounded on (1) lack of precedent, (2)
lack of a person in being to whom a legal duty was owed, and (3) fear
of fraudulent claims due to the relatively undeveloped state of medical
science. 9
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,10 decided in 1884, is generally credited with establishing the nonliability rule for prenatal
injuries and with touching off half a century of yet unresolved conftict. This landmark case involved a wrongful death action, which
was the result of the premature birth of a nonviable fetus. A defect in
a highway of the defendant town caused the mother, four or five
months advanced in pregnancy, to fall. The fall brought on a miscarriage. Thereafter, the deceased child's administrator brought a wrongful death action against the town. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held that an unborn child
was a part of its mother, not an individual human being. Therefore,
the child was not a "person" for whose wrongful death an action
might be maintained. The court found as a fact that the child was
8. See cases cited note 14 infra. "A person who negligently causes harm to
an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." RESTATENMIENT, TORTS
§869 (1939). Cf., A caveat is noted to the effect that the Institute takes no position
upon the question whether there is liability to a child hurt, while unborn, by a
person who intentionally or recklessly and without excuse harms the mother or
child. This distinction between a negligent injury and a willful injury is without
foundation since recovery in both cases necessarily requires recognition of the
unborn's legal status.
9. While these are the main grounds for a denial of recovery, a more elaborate
listing may be found in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
10. 138 Mass. 14, 16, 52 Am. Rep. 242, 244 (1884). The court noted that, "If
we should assume, irrespective of precedent, that a man might owe a civil duty
and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to one not yet in being, and
if we should assume also that causing an infant to be born prematurely stands on
the same footing as wounding or poisoning, we should then be confronted by
the question raised by the defendant, whether an infant dying before it was able
to live separated from its mother could be said to have become a person recognized
by the law as capable of having a locus standi in court, or of being represented
there by an administrator."
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born alive, but "was too little advanced in foetal life to survive its
premature birth."" Notwithstanding this finding, it is extremely
doubtful that under the circumstances the child survived birth. Even
if the child did survive birth, its lack of viability12 certainly contributed to its death and causation would have been difficult to establish. The opinion concluded by observing that because the unborn child was part of the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it was recoverable by the mother. This observation seems to
be an afterthought, and possibly it was intended as an excuse for
the decision. By ruling that the decedent was not a person in being,
the court neatly avoided the difficult problem of causation which later
presented insurmountable obstacles to many courts.
The next reported case involving a prenatal injury was Walker v.
Great No. Ry.1 3 In this case the mother, far advanced in pregnancy,

took passage on defendant's train. The train was involved in an acci(lent causing serious injury to mother and child. The child survived
birth, but was severely crippled. His personal injury suit alleged
that the injuries were a result of the accident. Since the action was in
negligence, preliminary to proving causation, the plaintiff had to
establish defendant's duty toward him; this proved impossible. The
declaration failed to disclose that the railroad company had knowledge of the existence of the child or of the mother's condition, or that
there was any valid contract with reference to the carriage of the child.
The court thus found that the defendant owed no independent duty
to the plaintiff, and hence, plaintiff had no cause of action. Finding
no duty, the court never came to grips with the problem whether
a child could have a cause of action for injuries sustained before
birth.
Both cases were actually off-center - Dietrich because of the decedent's lack of viability, and Walker because of the contractual theory
of the holding. However, both opinions were freely cited to support
denial of all recovery in any action involving prenatal injury, and
their effect on the development of the remedy was immense. When the
question was raised in other jurisdictions, they quickly fell in line. The
Dietrich position became firmly entrenched: An unborn child was
merely part of the mother and not entitled to protection. Prior to 1946,
thirteen jurisdictions considered prenatal cases, and all rigidly ad11.

Id. at 15, 52 Am. Rep. at 242.
12. Generally speaking, a fetus is considered viable when it has reached such
a stage of development that it can live outside the uterus. DORLAND, MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1528 (23d ed. 1957). Viability at the time of the injury was later
to become a pivotal point in many of the cases; see heading "VIABILITY
TION," infra.
13. 28 L.R. Ir.69 (Q.B. 1891).
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hered to precedent and denied recovery 4 except California where recovery was allowed by statute.' 5 The law crystalized in this position
notwithstanding unanimous condemnation of the rule by all writers
that discussed the problem. 16 However, the criticism was not without
effect.
DEVELOPIENT OF THE REMEDY

Judicial dissatisfaction with the Dietrich rule began with the dissenting opinion of Judge Boggs of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp." The plaintiff was a surviving child who
allegedly had been crippled by the defendant's negligence during
the latter days of the normal uterine term. The court denied recovery
on the precedent and rationale of Dietrich, even though the hospital
apparently had undertaken for hire to deliver safely the plaintiff
child who was already viable.
However, the important contribution of the case was not the questionable reasoning of the majority opinion, but the eloquent dissent

of Judge Boggs. Judge Boggs began his opinion by dismissing the lack
of precedent: "fAin adjudicated case is not indispensable to establish
a right to recover under the rules of the common law.""' Citing Lord
Mansfield he continued: "'The law of England would be an absurd
science were it found upon precedents only. Precedents . .. illustrate
principles . . . . "'9 He then struck out at the lack-of-separate-legal
20
existence theory:

14. Alabama: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So.
566 (1926); Illinois: Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900);
Massachusetts: Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, supra note 10; Michigan:
Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937); Missouri: Buel v.
United Ry., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); New Jersey: Stemmer v. Kline, 128
N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942); New York: Drobner v. Peters, 282 N.Y. 220, 133
N.E. 567 (1921); Ohio: Mays v. Weingarten, 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio 1943); Pennsylvania: Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940); Rhode Island:
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 At. 704 (1901) (wrongful death for stillbirth);
Texas: Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944
(1935) (wrongful death for stillbirth); and Wisconsin: Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec.
Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916). This is discounting Louisiana
as the Cooper decision was not published until 1949; see note 27 infra.
15. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939).
16. See PROss.R, ToRTs §36 (2d ed. 1955) and articles cited at note 72 therein.
17. 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
18. 184 Ill. at 368, 56 N.E. at 640.
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 870, 56 N.E. at 641. This language later became the point of departure for the development of the viability limitation on recovery, which is
the law in Illinois today. See Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
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"fill, while in the wonib, it reaches that prenatal age of xiability when the destruction of the life of the mother does not
necessarily end its existence also . . . it is but to deny a palpable fact to argue there is but one life, and that the life of
the mother."
After noting that both property law and criminal law recognize an
unborn child as a legal person, he concluded with the poignant
21
comment:
"[Aind if every legitimate infant in ventre sa mere is to be
deemed as born for all purposes beneficial to the child, why
should it be supposed the common law would have denied to an
infant born alive the right to recover damages for the injury
inflicted upon it while in the womb of the mother?"
It was only a matter of time until the compelling logic of Judge
Boggs' position was adopted. However, despite the appealing equities
of almost every case presented and the injustice of the Dietrich rule,
many courts still balked at troublesome problems of proof. In prenatal injury cases courts were unwilling to admit that a right was
independent of proof, and that the failure of proof only precludes
recovery. Another quarter of a century expired before the first decision allowing recovery was reported. 2
Although not always expressly spelled out in the opinions, when
viewed in retrospect the major obstruction to recovery appears to
have been, and to some extent remains, the fear of vexatious suits
and fraudulent claims.23 But the difficulty of proof is no greater
than in many other matters requiring expert medical opinion on the
causal sequence of events. 24 The problems of medical proof presented
in these cases closely parallel problems that have been at least partially solved in mental disturbance actions.2 Admittedly, the danger
is a real one, but the legal system has been equal to the challenge in
similarly perplexing matters. If the situation is as the skeptics intimate.
21. 184 Ill. at 371, 56 N.E. at 641.
22. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). But see note 27 infpa.
23. See, e.g., Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. supra note 14; Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra note 14; Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co..
8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.WV.2d 163 (1959).
24. Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958).
25. See PROSSER, TORTS §37 (2d ed. 1955). With respect to the mental disturbance cases, Prosser notes that "it is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon
satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the claim.
or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. The
problem is one of adequate proof, and it is not necessary to deny a remedy in all
cases because some claims may be false." See also Case Comment, 11 U. FLA. L.
RFV. 262 (1958).
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continued enforcement of criminal abortion statutes amounts to a patent and unjust denial of due process. Indeed, in these criminal cases
the evidence must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, certainly
a stricter requirement than the preponderance rule of the civil cases.
THE RULE ALLOWING RECOVERY

Tort Action by the Surviving Child
Bonbrest v. Kotz2 6 is generally credited with establishing the rule
of recovery.2 7 Indeed, Bonbrest has become a landmark, comparable
only to the role of Dietrich in the development of this remedy. Yet
the facts of Bonbrest neither possess inherently greater appeal nor cry
more loudly for relief than many earlier cases in which relief was denied.
Bette Bonbrest sued to recover for injuries she allegedly received
at birth as a result of negligent delivery. In denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court reviewed existing precedent
and distinguished "the rather anomalous doctrine" of Dietrich because
in that case the decedent was not viable. The court proceeded:28
"As to a viable child being 'part' of its mother - this argument seems ... to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in

the womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine life - and while
dependent for its continued development on sustenance derived from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a
'part' of the mother in the sense of a constituent element ....
26. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
27. It should be noted that Bonbrest was not the first case allowing recovery.
As early as 1924 recovery was allowed. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (C.P.
1924). In this case a child born without a hand was held to have a cause of action
for injuries sustained while yet unborn. This decision was not picked up by the
other jurisdictions, possibly due to the fact that the opinion was from the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. This case was later impliedly overruled by the holding in Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra note 14. Scott v.
McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939) allowed a malpractice
suit for injuries allegedly incurred due to negligent delivery. The suit was based
on the California Civil Code which provided: "A child conceived, but not yet born,
is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in
the event of its subsequent birth." The third American decision was Cooper v.
Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923). Unfortunately, for some unexplained
reason, the decision was not released for publication until 1949. The first opinion
of any court of last resort was rendered by the Canadian Supreme Court in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (Can.). The decision was
based on the civil law which begins a person's rights at conception. Perhaps this
explains its lack of acceptance by the American jurisdictions.
28. 65 F. Supp. at 140. In summary, the court noted that, "The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science certainly has made
progress since 1884." Id. at 143.
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Bonbrest was the turning point in the judicial evolution of the
remedy. Modern decisions leave no doubt that recovery is the majority rule today.29 Courts now analyzing pre-Bonbrest decisions and
their reasons for denying recovery find "them based upon an outworn
point of view, now rejected by modern medicine and rejected by the
later cases." 30 The cases denying a right to recovery for prenatal
injuries cannot be examined
"without being impressed by the harsh3' 1
ness of such a result.'

Decisions overthrowing the Dietrich rule have predicated their
results on several grounds. Some courts have stressed the independence of the child as a separate entity,32 and pursued this premise to
its logical conclusion. Since the law recognizes an unborn child's
property rights and protects the child against crimes, the law should
also recognize an unborn child for the purpose of redressing torts.3
Other courts urge that lack of precedent is no basis for denying re84
covery,
that is, disallowing the action would allow a wrong to
exist without a remedy. The courts are nearly unanimous in pointing
out that the advances of medical science do not merely justify, but
5
compel recovery.
Recovery has now been allowed in thirteen of the fifteen jurisdictions that have considered the prenatal tort question since Bonbrest.36 Nine additional jurisdictions during the same period either
partly or completely overruled pre-Bonbrest positions to join the
29. See notes 36 and 37 infra.
30. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, -140, 79 A.2d 550, 560 (1950).
31. Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1017 (1950).
32. E.g., Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Di%. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953). The
real issue is not physical separability but legal separability. California solved the
problem by statute: Scott v. McPheeters, supra note 27. See also Smith N. Brennan.
31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
33. Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 22; Tucker %.Howard L. Carmichael & Sons,
Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, supra note
27.
34. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, supra note 32; Williams %. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
35. E.g., Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1950); Verkennes
v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365; 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
36. Connecticut: Tursi N. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111
A.2d 14 (Super. Ct. 1955); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del.
258, 128 A.2d 557 (Super. Ct. 1956); Georgia: Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael &Sons, Inc., supra note 33; Iowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Stpp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960);
Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955) (wrongful death action
impliedly recognizing the right of a surviving child to recover); Maryland: Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra note 35; Minnesota: Verkennes v. Cornica, supra note
35 (wrongful death action); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d
434 (1954) (wrongful death action); New Hampshire: Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H.
265; 51 A.2d 847 (1947) (dictum indicates the possibility of recovery); Oregon:
Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); South Carolina: Hall v.
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majority view. 3 7 This leaves only three jurisdictions adhering to their

pre-Bonbrest decisions 38 and none of these has had occasion to reexamine its holding in light of recent precedent. Whether these courts
will follow the other pre-Bonbrest jurisdictions and overrule their
former opinions remains to be seen; however, the trend of reversal is
clear.
Wrongful Death Actions
Prenatal injuries also give rise to wrongful death actions when
the child dies either before or after birth. This action, like its tort
counterpart, has been the subject of much discussion. However, unlike its counterpart, the wrongful death actions have not experienced
the same uninterrupted trend as the tort actions. Four jurisdictions
have pre-Bonbrest decisions denying recovery, decided when recovery
for prenatal injury was universally denied.39 Since Bonbrest some
courts have made recovery conditional, whereas others have been
less stringent.
Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Tennessee: Shousha v. Matthews
Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1962); Washington: Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962). Two decisions have
left the law uncertain. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.V.2d 229
(1951) involved a wrongful death action brought for the stillbirth of the decedent. The opinion affirmed the trial court's sustaining of a demurrer on the
ground that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action. The basis of the decision was
a finding of lack of precedent; however, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted
"[Tihere are cases holding that a child born alive may maintain an action for prenatal injuries.... This question, however, is not before us and we leave it for determination if and when it arises." Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953)
adopted the Drabbels decision and therefore may be interpreted as not necessarily
barring an action if instituted by a surviving child.
37. Illinois: Amann v. Faidy, supra note 20 (action for wrongful death of
surviving child); Massachusetts: Keys v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633,
165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) (while refusing to expressly overrule Dietrich, the court
held that in view of modern precedent, Dietrich should be strictly limited to its
facts. It should be remembered that in Dietrich the infant was not viable at the
time of the injury); Michigan: La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445
(1960) (while not passing directly on the issue in question, the court indicated it
would allow an action when the issue is next presented to the court); Missouri:
Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.V.2d 577 (1953) (action for wrongful death
of surviving child); New Jersey: Smith v. Brennan, supra note 32; New York:
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Ohio: Williams v. Marion
Rapid Transit, Inc., supra note 34; Pennsylvania: Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,
164 A.2d 93 (1960); Wisconsin: Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 23
(while recovery was denied for insufficient evidence, the court recognized the
right of action by way of dictum).
38. Alabama, Rhode Island, and Texas; see cases cited note 14 supra.
39. Alabama: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 14; Michigan:
Newman v. City of Detroit, supra note 14; Rhode Island: Gorman v. Budlong,
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In examining the wrongful death decisions, a distinction must be
made between postnatal deaths and stillbirths. In the postnatal death
situation few difficult problems arise and the decisions are in accord.
Under the general wrongful death statutes, patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act, 40 the remedy is "derivative," that is, statutory beneficiaries have a right of action if, and only if, the deceased would
have had a cause of action had he survived. 4 1 Thus, the fundamental
question is the same as in the tort area: Did the infant have a cause
of action before its death? Once the right of the surviving infant to
recover for his prenatal injuries is established, the right to the
wrongful death action by statutory beneficiaries in the postnatal
death situation is free from doubt. Confirming this reasoning, all
modern decisions have allowed the action in such circumstances.42
The question then becomes: When does a cause of action accrue to
the unborn child, at the time of injury or when born alive?
Seven jurisdictions have required the child to survive birth by imposing conditional liability.43 In these cases the child is held to have
potential legal existence and the tortfeasor is conditionally liable for
his actions, but neither contingency is realized until successful birth.
The theory of this holding is that an unborn child is recognized onlN
for purposes beneficial to him and only a child that survives birth is
capable of being benefited. Thus, if the child is born alive and subsequently dies, the action may be maintained even though recovery
benefits only the statutory beneficiaries. However, if there is a stillbirth, as distinguished from a postnatal death, no action is available
because there was never a person in being capable of being benefited.
Such argument obviously escapes logic, and some courts have been
more realistic.
Contrary to the conditional liability approach, seven jurisdictions
have affirmatively sanctioned the wrongful death action in the stillbirth situation.44 These decisions are primarily bottomed on a recognition that the unborn child is in fact a presently existing person. If
supra note 14; Texas: Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra note 14.
40. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
41. Mitchell v. Couch, supra note 36; Verkennes v. Corniea, supra note 35. See
FLA. STAT. §768.01 (1961); Steggall v. Morris, supra note 37.
42. See cases cited note 45 infra.
43. California: Norman v. Murphy, supra note 4; Massachusetts: Keyes .
Construction Serv., Inc., supra note 37 (dictum); Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil
Co., supra note 36; New York: Muschetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 208 Misc. 870.
144 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Oklahoma: Howell v. Rushing, supra note 36:
South Carolina: West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958); Tennessee:
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
44. Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., supra note 36; Georgia: Porter
. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch.
supra note 36; Louisiana: Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847
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the unborn child is capable of separate existence, it is illogical to conclude that any injury was wholly that of the mother and not also of
the child. Decisions in four other jurisdictions indicate a similar probable result. 45
In addition to the problem of recognizing the unborn child's legal
personality, difficult problems of proof with respect to damages are
also encountered. The general rule is that the measure of damages is
the loss of services to the party bringing the action, yet, when a stillbirth occurs or when the child lives but a short time following birth
there is little basis on which proof of actual loss can be predicated. 6
Also, it has been urged that it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the legislatures never intended a stillborn child to be considered a
"person" within the purview of the statutes. Such considerations have
led several courts to suggest that the remedy should not be extended
4
to the stillbirth situation without express legislative authorization. 7
Despite these problems, it is argued that arbitrary exclusion of
stillbirth cases from a remedy is an unjustified limitation. The child
is just as dead, the conduct is no less wrong, and the tortfeasor
should still be held to account for the natural and probable consequences of his wrongful conduct. Some concern about the pecuniary
valuation of the invaded interest is justified. But this is not a uniquely
complicated evidentiary problem and should not be allowed to defeat fair compensation. In any case, the artificial distinction between
stillbirth and death soon after birth is not a sound basis for conditioning liability. It is a legal distinction that contradicts both
reason and medical science. In addition, it is doubtful that any of
the nineteenth century legislatures contemplated prenatal problems
in enacting wrongful death statutes. A more reasonable interpretation of the statutes would leave to the courts the task of supplying
(La. Ct. App. 1951) (while the court ruled that the evidence did not sustain an
allowance for damages because the plaintiff's child was not born alive, it indicated
that recovery would be allowed upon proper proof); Minnesota: Verkennes v.
Corniea, supra note 35; Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, supra note 36; New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
45. Connecticut: Partes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d
633 (Super. Ct. 1955); Illinois: Amann v. Faidy, supra note 20; Missouri: Steggall
v. Morris, supra note 37; Ohio: Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d

809 (1950).
46. In Hord v. Homeopathic Hosp., 102 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.D.C. 1952), the
court left the entire matter of damages to the jury's discretion. "In the case of an
infant who has not as yet developed any earning capacity, there is a greater play
for discretion on the part of the jury. This circumstance, however, constitutes no
reason for not awarding substantial damages for the death of a small child. Otherwise, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated to that extent and a person
who negligently caused the death of an infant would be free of all liability."
47. Hogan v. McDaniel, supra note 43; Norman v. Murphy, supra note 4.
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concrete applications of the statutes by reference to the ever-changing
needs of society.
The ultimate outcome of the stillbirth cases is at best uncertain.
Many fears, which are never expressed or only hinted at in the
opinions, influence the decisions; but conceptually it would seem
that the stillbirth exclusion is without logical support.
Thus, the decisions in prenatal tort and wrongful death actions
demonstrate that the Dietrich rule of nonliability has been badly
shaken and today is in full retreat. What the result in the stillbirth
cases will be is still unclear, but in other prenatal injury cases the
jurisdictions seem to be moving ahead in concert to allow recovery.
Concurrently, the courtroom debate is shifting to another important
question: What limitations should be imposed on the right to a
remedy being created by the ebb of Dietrich?
VIABILITY V. CONCEPTION

Superimposed upon issues affecting the existence of a prenatal
cause of action is the question of how far the remedy should be extended. Assuming that an infant or his administrator is afforded a
right of action, may either seek recompense for injuries inflicted at
any time subsequent to conception or should recovery be allowed only
for injuries sustained after some specified stage of fetal life has been
attained? Most jurisdictions have resolved this question by imposing
a viability requirement.- s However, the trend of recent decisions indicates an increasing favor for the more liberal conception theory.
It has been suggested that the viability rule reflects the logical difficulty of articulating how an independent duty can be owed to a
nonentity that, as a matter of medical fact, is incapable of independent
existence. 49 In reality, however, the rule appears to be grounded on
historical precedent and fear of fraudulent claims.
Justice Holmes foreshadowed the viability rule in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton by inquiring "whether an infant dying
before it was able to live separated from its mother could be said to
This raised an
have become a person recognized by the law . . .
inference that a right of action could only rest on some concept of
48. Maryland has adopted the unusual limitation of requiring that
be "quick" at the time of injury. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, supra note 35.
a fetus may be distinguished from an embryo in that the latter term
applied only to the early stages within the uterus, while fetus is the
used term following the third month of development. However, in
"'fetus" is used in the broad sense, from conception to delivery.
49. See Note, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554, 562 (1962).
50. 138 Mass. 14, 16, 52 Am. Rep. 242, 244 (1884).
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separability from the mother, in other words, viability. Judge Boggs
augmented the strength of this inference when he emphasized its
1
His penetrating dissent
logic in urging an overthrow of Dietrich.5
was of great import upon the future development of the remedy, and
it was seized upon by later courts in seeking an "out" from Dietrich;
thus emerged the viability rule.
Another key factor in dethroning Dietrich was the tremendous
advances in medical science subsequent to 1884. Originally the status
of an unborn child was considered a legal rather than a medical question. In the then existing state of medical science, that conclusion
was not immediately challenged. However, persistent scientific arguments to the contrary scored their first serious breakthrough with
the concession by some courts that the status of an unborn child was
in fact a medical question. But fear of fraudulent claims persisted;
the argument that the conception theory "ignored reality and fact"
continued.52 One court even refused a remedy partially because of
the difficult problem of proving viability. 53 The struggle over recognition of the right had been a long and hard-fought battle. Courts
that initially were reluctant to recognize prenatal injuries understandably did not prove eager to allow the action from the moment
of conception.
Regardless of the practical reasons for the viability limitation, it
is no longer supportable. There is little rational justification for allowing recovery to a seven-month-old infant while denying it to a sixmonth-old infant. The one is crippled as badly as the other. The biological fact is that separate life begins at the moment of fertilization.Enforcement of the viability limitation only raises an extremely diffi-

51. See notes 17 through 21 supra and accompanying text.
52. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 505, 93 S.E.2d 727,
729 (1956) (concurring opinion). "The ruling of the majority in this case extends
[the rule] to allow the child to maintain a suit for damages to the cell from
which it came, even though the cell had been conceived ten seconds."
53. Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, supra note 14.
54. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 466, 26 A.2d 489, 687 (1942) (dissenting
opinion). While the majority followed Dietrich and denied recovery, Chief Justice
Brogan, dissenting, said: "While it is a fact that there is a close dependence by
the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not disputed today that
the mother and the child are two separate and distinct entities; that the unborn
child has its own system of circulation of the blood separate and apart from the
mother; that there is no communication between the two circulation systems;
that there is no dependence by the child on the mother except for sustenance.
It might be remarked here that even after birth the child depends for sustenance
upon the mother or upon a third party. It is not the fact that an unborn child
is part of the mother, but rather in the unborn state it lived with the mother,
we might say, and from conception on developed its own distinct, separate personality."
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cult burden of proof.5 The fallacy of the viability rule is especiall)
emphasized by advances in medical science; a child may be viable
at six months today whereas fifty years ago viability probably occurred
at eight months.
In negligence actions the tortfeasor is generally held liable for all
the natural and probable consequences of his actions. 56 All provable
prenatal injuries could be sustained on this ground. The previable
injury is just as much a natural and probable consequence as an injury during the viable stage. The fact that an infant may be nonviable does not make the tortfeasor's wrongful conduct any less damaging. The problem of proving causation varies according to the
particular facts of each case. It bears little, if any, relation to the
point of viability. The burden of proof is still on the plaintiff; if
he cannot prove his case within the existing rules of evidence, he
should not recover. Arbitrary disallowance of actions to nonviable
infants is thus an artificial and unjustified limitation on the basic
right of recovery.
The illogical results caused by the viability rule have caused the
courts in seven states to disapprove the viability limitation. 57 The
obvious trend of recent decisions is in favor of the conception theory
and all present indications suggest that with increased medical advances this trend will predominate.
Wrongful death actions present a more difficult problem. No court
has yet passed on the availability of a remedy for previable death.
55. See PROSSER, TORTS §36 (2d ed. 1955). That this burden of proof may be
extremely difficult to surmount is demonstrated by two facts. fhe possible causes

of abortion are many, the least frequent of which is trauma. Gray divides these
possible causes into live general categories which include (1) pathological conditions; (2) uterine causes and faulty implantation; (3) endocrine and metabolk
causes; (4) systemic causes; and (5) trauma. The category of trauma is furthe,
subdivided into

(1) effects of surgery;

(2) effects of irradiation;

(3) internal

trauma; (4) external trauma; and (5) psychic trauma. Secondly, competent proof
may be difficult to obtain. Abortion usually occurs in the early months of preg-

nancy. The embryo is expelled in a piecemeal fashion and lost in the passage of
blood thereby making it unavailable for examination. Furthermore, uterinal
examination is very difficult. However, these problems are largely overcome if
the abortion occurs after the tenth week as the fetus is usually expelled whole in
this case. 1 GRAY, ATrORNEYs' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 158.02 (Supp. 1961).
56. Cone v. Inter County Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1949); Dunn Ilia,
Serv. v. McKinley, 130 Fla. 778, 178 So. 865 (1938).
57. Georgia: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., supa note 52; Illinois:
Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); New Hampshire: Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); New Jersey: Smith v. Brennan.
supra note 32; New York: Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696
(1953); Pennsyh,ania: Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). Wisconsin

has indicated it would likewise allow the extension. Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins.
Co., supra note 23. This case was dismissed for insufficient evidence but the court
iecognized that a child might have a right of action even before viability.
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As the key to this remedy appears to be whether the fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the statutes, 58 there may be considerably
greater reluctance to recognize the nonviable fetus.
The decision in La Blue v. Speckler,59 although not directly on
point, sheds some light on the previable problem. In that case the
plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of her father who
died before she was viable. The court held that she was a "person"
within the meaning of the Michigan Wrongful Death Act and therefore entitled to maintain the action. The court recognized: 0
"[T]here may be difficulty in proving causation and . . . such
a holding may give rise to fictitious claims. However, this
difficulty and danger are not peculiar to this type of action
and do not appear to be so much greater than in the case of
many other matters of medical opinion on the sequence of
events. Our holding in this regard is that if such a person can
prove the damage, he makes out a right to recover. This is in
accord with recent judicial opinion and modern medical
science."
Care should be taken not to confuse evidentiary problems with
the basic right to a remedy. The same reasons exist for allowing an
action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus as for a viable fetus.
The chance of recovery will proportionately decrease, because the
difficulty of proof will increase as one proceeds further back in fetal
time. This, in turn, will decrease the possibility of nonmeritorious
recovery while leaving the law in a flexible position to absorb future
advances in medical science.
Although far from settled today, the American law on prenatal
injuries may be summarized as follows. When the child dies before
birth, divergent authorities both permit and deny recovery. When
the child survives birth, a further distinction is necessary. If the
injury was received while viable, recovery will be allowed, at least
in all of the post-Bonbrest jurisdictions, in either a wrongful death
action or an action brought by the surviving child. If the injury was
sustained during the previable stage, the current trend will allow an
action by the surviving child; and although the availability of the
wrongful death action in this situation has not yet been drawn in
question, a similar result seems probable.

58. See Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.V.2d 901 (Ky. 1955).
59. 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960).
60. Id. at 577, 100 N.V.2d at 455.
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The reported decisions in Florida have not yet directly dealt with
any aspect of prenatal injury. The reason for this is not a lack of
prenatal trauma within the borders of our state, but rather a high
frequency of extra-judicial settlements. Regardless of the reasons and
notwithstanding the lack of Florida precedent, an examination of
relevant Florida law should be made in an effort to explore the problems that might be raised by such actions and to make an intelligent
prediction of how the prenatal cases will be or should be handled, if
and when they arise.
Tort Actions

In granting a remedy for prenatal injuries, most courts have relied
on analogous areas of the law to support their holdings. 61 An examination of Florida law reveals very similar authority for the protection
of the unborn child's rights. The capacity of a posthumous child to
inherit from its parents is undisputed in Florida. Shone v. Belilmore,
which involved an unborn child's right to homestead property, adopted Lord Hardwicke's view of the law:62
"[A] child in ventre sa mere, both by the rules of the common
and civil law, is to all intents and purposes a child, as much as
if born in the father's lifetime."
Although such language was broader than necessary to sustain the
ruling in the Shone case, it indicates an early disposition of the court
to acknowledge the unborn child's interests.
The legislature has also recognized the "legal personality" of an
unborn child and has taken steps to protect his interests under the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Law by expressly providing that
a child "shall include a posthumous child.
...6,'
The Florida abortion statute 64 protects the unborn child from
criminal invasion. Since criminal statutes are usually enacted for
the protection of society, the abortion statute must be predicated on
the theory that the life of "a quick child" is sufficiently important to
be considered a part of the aggregate society entitled to protection.
61. E.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, supra note 33 at 206, 65
S.E.2d at 912. Almost the entire opinion is spent examining the Georgia property
and criminal law. The conclusion reached was that solely on the basis of those
analogies, the "courts of Georgia have the authority now . . . to recognize the
remedy."
62. 75 Fla. 515, 522, 78 So. 605, 607 (1918).
63. FLA. STAT. §440.02 (13) (1961).
64. FLA. STAT. §782.10 (1961).
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Thus, the protection afforded by this statute is not against the act of
abortion but rather against the destruction of the fetus. 65
Whenever the Florida law has considered the unborn child's interest, the child's "legal personality" has been recognized. The inference is unavoidable that such a child is a person and possesses
the rights that accrue to a person even though he may not be able
to exercise them himself. If an unborn child may not be legally deprived of his life or property it is difficult to perceive how that same
unborn child may be physically impaired by another's tortious actions
without creating a right to compensation in the child.
The Florida Constitution guarantees that for every wrong there
shall be a remedy: 66
"All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person
for any injury done him ... shall have remedy, by due course
of law.. .. "

As the Supreme Court of Ohio noted with respect to an identical
constitutional provision:67
"To hold that the plaintiff ... did not suffer an injury in her
person would require this court to announce that as a matter
of law the infant is a part of the mother until birth and has
no existence in law until that time .... [Sluch a ruling would
deprive the infant of the right conferred by the Constitution
upon all persons, by the application of a time-worn fiction not
founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and
unjustified."
The lack-of-precedent argument has been eliminated and the lackof-legal-personality argument has been weakened by decisions in other
jurisdictions. 0s Concurrently, the fear of fraudulent claims, based on
the unreliability of medical proof, has been greatly mitigated by
sweeping advances in the medical sciences. Indeed, in manslaughter
cases arising under abortion statutes, criminal law regularly faces the
problem of determining if a feticide has been caused by pre-existing
conditions or by the criminal acts of the defendant.69
65. FLA. STAT. §§797.01 and 797.02 (1961) constitute the Florida abortion laws
which lay down strict penalties for performing, assisting or providing the means
for abortion.
66. FLA. CoNsT. Decl. of Rights, §4. See Holland ex rel. Williams v. Mayes,
155 Fla. 129, 19 So. 2d 709 (1944); Henderson v. Henderson, 14 Fla. Supp. 181
(Civ. Ct. Rec. 1958).
67. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128, 87 N.E.2d
334, 340 (1949).
68. See notes 36 through 38 supra and accompanying text.
69. E.g., Williams v. State, 34 Fla. 217, 15 So. 760 (1894).
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An examination of analogous Florida law certainly indicates a
logical basis upon which a Florida court could allow the prenatal tort
action. Assuming that Florida allowed this, the courts would then
be faced with the decision whether to impose the viability limitation.
The current trend representing the better view is away from the
viability limitation, but no positive statement can be formulated for
a future Florida position.
Death Actions

The wrongful death provisions in Florida are embodied in four
statutes. Two of these statutes, purportedly patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act, will be referred to as the General Wrongful Death
Act.70 The other two will be referred to as the Wrongful Death of
2
Minors Act-, and the Survival Act.7 The peculiar provisions of these

statutes and their inequitable intermeshing has prompted the Florida
Supreme Court to call for legislative action to resolve the problems
raised. 73 Unfortunately, no progress has yet been made in this direction. Although the statutes create a virtual morass of conflicting
and contrasting remedies, such problems will be referred to only when
directly related to the prenatal question.74
To consider these statutes one must assume that Florida courts
would allow a surviving child an action for prenatal injury. If such
an action were denied, it would be judicial recognition that the unborn child is without legal personality. This decision would necessarily preclude the possibility of any wrongful death action involving
prenatal injury, with one possible exception to be noted. The postnatal death and stillbirth situations must be distinguished because
the stillbirth situation poses some additional problems; these qualifications are set out when appropriate.I. Wlrongful Death of Minors Act

Section 768.03 of Florida Statutes 1961, the most unique of the
the Florida death statutes, provides in part:
70. FLA. STAT. §§768.01-.02 (1961).
71. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1961).
72. FLA. STA'r. §45.11 (1961). This statute also covers situations other than
wrongful death, hut for purposes of the present discussion attention will be directed

only to cases arising in a wrongful death context.
73.

Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955).

74. For an excellent discussion of the acts and their attendant poblems.
see Alpert, The Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 153 (1957). Alpert concludes his article with this comment: "The truly appalling situation in Florida

arising out of our Death Acts cannot be overemphasized. The grief, misery and
travail, loss and destitution, are unnecessary. The Death Acts must be changed."
75. For a general discussion of how this problem has been handled in othet
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"Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused by
the wrongful act ... of any individual .... the father... may
maintain an action ...

and may recover, not only for the loss

of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such
sum for the mental pain and suffering of the parent[s] ...."
a. Legislative History and Intent. The immediate problem presented by the act is whether the term "minor child" includes an unborn infant. Of primary importance in determining statutory effect
is legislative intent and any uncertainty as to the legislative intent
should be resolved by an interpretation that best accords with the
public benefit.76 Sometimes the interpretations of similar enactments
in other jurisdictions are helpful, but as this form of action exists
only in Florida the decisions of other forums are of little significance77
Likewise, the history of this act sheds little light on legislative intent.
As originally enacted in 1899, the statute created a "derivative" action.
The parents brought the action "as the legal representative of such
deceased minor child."78 When the Florida laws were re-enacted in
1906, apparently through oversight, the portions of the act pertaining
to the liability of individuals were omitted, giving rise to attacks on
the act's constitutionality as class legislation that denied equal protection under the laws.7 9 These attacks and the possibility of the
courts finding the act unconstitutional s° prompted renewed interest
in the statute when the legislature met in 1913.
As far as the records indicate, on April 11, 1913, bills identical in
substance to the act of 189981 were introduced in both the House and
Senate. 82 The bills followed the usual route through committees, were
reported out favorably, passed the respective branches without dissenting vote,8 3 and were exchanged; the House accepted the Senate copy.84
Although both bills had been entitled as legislation "for the Death
of Minors," the act provided an action for "the death of any minor
child," as had its 1899 predecessor. The significance, if any, of omitting "child" from the title of the act has been lost in the passage of
time. It could be argued from the title of the act that it was intended
jurisdictions see notes 43 through 47 supra and accompanying text.
76. Sunshine State News Co. v. State, 121 So. 2d 705 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
77. Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
78. Fla. Laws 1899, ch.4722.
79. E.g., Pensacola Elec. Co. v. Soderlind, 60 Fla. 164, 53 So. 722 (1910).
80. Ibid. (dissenting opinion).
81. Compare Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4722 with Fla. Laws 1913, ch. 6487.
82. Bill No. 28, FLA. H.J. 232 (1913); Bill No. 117, FLA. S.J. 186 (1913). Unfortunately, only the titles to the bills were printed in the record and therefore
it is impossible to tell conclusively if these bills were identical.
83. Bill No. 28, FLA. H.J. 549 (1913); Bill No. 117, FLA. S.J. 405 (1913).
84. Bill No. 117, FLA. S.J. 1485 (1913).
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only to provide a remedy for "minors," that is, children from birth
to age twenty-one. However, nothing in the act, in the events surrounding its passage, or in its subsequent history lends any more
validity to this conclusion than to one supporting a broader interpretation.
However, one significant change had been made: the act was no
longer derivative in nature; it gave the parents a cause of action in
their own right.8 5 The supreme court in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Moseley16 explained the reason for the 1913 change in the nature of
the action and part of the philosophy behind the act. The court
noted that a parent could not recover damages directly in his own
right for the wrongful death of his child under the General Wrongful
Death Act unless he were dependent on that child for support. In
absence of dependency, the parent would recover only as beneficiary
of the child's estate.,
However, the parent's loss was not merely the
loss of a prospective estate, but more important, the loss of the love,
comfort and society of the child. The Wrongful Death of Minors
Act was intended to provide a remedy for this latter type of loss, and
no reason existed for denying parents recovery in their own right as
the act of 1899 did.s Thus, the statute was changed and in the 1913
form it creates neither a "survival" nor a "derivative" action. It
furnishes an entirely new cause of action, unknown to the common
law, that arises out of the death of the child and gives full recognition to the basic relationship between parent and child. 9Since the statute is in derogation of the common law it would seem
that the rule of strict construction should apply. But the supreme
court has adopted a more liberal approach by repeatedly holding that
the statute is remedial in nature and should be accorded a construction consistent with the humanitarian objective sought to be accomplished. 90 Aside from these pronouncements, no indication of legislative intent or purpose is to be found. Apparently then, the act should
be interpreted to best effectuate the public benefit.
In examining specific possibilities of the act's extension to the
prenatal area, it is necessary to distinguish between the alternative
situations in which a cause of action might accrue, namely (1) prenatal
injury resulting in postnatal death and (2) prenatal injury resulting
in stillbirth.

85. Supra note 81.
86. 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718 (1910).
87. FLA. STAT. §768.02 (1961).
88. Supra note 86.
89. Klepper v. Breslin, supra note 77.
90. E.g., Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1920); Klepper v. Breslin,
supra note 77.
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b. Postnatal Death. The Wrongful Death of Minors Act should
sustain an action by the parents to recover for the postnatal death of
their child, since a child in being died as a result of another's tortious
conduct. Such an interpretation best comports with the public benefit
theory, with the liberal approach advocated by the court in other
instances, and with the concept that regards the law as a living and
constantly developing system.
As noted earlier, other areas of Florida law recognize the "legal
personality" of an unborn child.91 Consistency in this recognition and
continued recognition of the "basic relationship" between parent and
child, seem to require a remedy under this act. The purpose of this
cause of action is to provide compensation not only for the loss of
services of the child but, of greater importance and primary concern,
for the "mental pain and suffering" of the parents. In keeping with
the primary purpose of the act, a parent's mental change or illness
caused by the loss of his child is considered a proper element of
"mental pain and suffering."92 No one would seriously contend that
damages are eliminated or significantly lessened if the injury is inflicted during the prenatal state and the child dies subsequent to birth
as a result.
Indeed, this highly peculiar statute seems to support recovery for
a postnatal death even should Florida's tort law deny an action for
prenatal torts. No statutory condition precedent requires the decedent
to possess a cause of action before one accrues to the parents, as is
the case in the General Wrongful Death Acts. The action is neither
"survival" nor "derivative." Independent of tort concepts the "basic
relationship" still exists and calls for allowance of a remedy. The
child has died whether the injury was inflicted before viability, after
viability, at birth or subsequent to birth. If the policy behind the statute is carried to its logical conclusion, the child's parents should be
protected against tortious invasions of their right to the love, comfort
and society of their child. To condition the right of action upon the
time of the injury is incongruity in the greatest degree.
c. PrenatalDeath or Stillbirth. Recovery for stillbirth is not inherently barred by the particular provisions of the Wrongful Death
of Minors Act. The same arguments apply as in postnatal death
situations and it would appear that recovery should be allowed upon
proper proof. The conditional prospective liability rule, imposed by
other courts to bar recovery, 3 is unrelated to the basic reasons under91.
92.
Donat,
93.

See notes 62 through 67 supra and accompanying text.
E.g., Winner v. Sharp, 43 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1949); Coast Cities Coaches v.
106 So. 2d 593 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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lying Florida's Wrongful Death ol Minors Act. That rule, if applied,
would deny parents an action in their own right, 94 the very reason for
which the statute was enacted. Since the major function and practical
effect of the statute is to protect the parent's interest in the love,
comfort and society of his child, it may be argued that the parent's
interest in prospective parenthood should likewise be protected.
d. Damages. The measure of damages under this statute is the
"loss of services" the parent would be entitled to between death and
the majority of the minor, plus the "mental pain and suffering" of
the parent. 95 Obviously, in any case involving a stillbirth or an early
death, "loss of services" will be difficult to ascertain or prove. However, "mental pain and suffering" remains a very substantial element
of damages in any case. 90 Difficulty in measuring the first item of
damages should not affect the basic right to remedy. The plaintiff
bears the burden of proof and should be entitled to recover the
amount of damages that can be established within the rules of evidence.
The matter of damages under this statute raises the problem of
9
multiple recovery. This problem is suggested in Ephrem v. Phillips 7
which recognized a mother's personal injury action for a tortiously
inflicted abortion of a previable fetus. The plaintiff mother, who was
injured in an automobile accident, sought recovery for the pain and
anguish suffered and for expenses incurred as a result of injuries. She
contended that these items of damage were aggravated by the abortion
which the initial injuries caused. Although the main question was
whether the abortion damages- must be specially pleaded, the court
stated: 99

94. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
95. Miami Dairy Farms v. Tinsley, 115 Fla. 164, 155 So. 852 (1934).
96. E.g., Hooper Constr. Co. v. Drake, 73 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1954) (S35,000 not
excessive for wrongful death of five-year old); Atlantic Peninsular Holding Co. v.
Oenbrink, 133 Fla. 325, 182 So. 812 (1938) ($4,000 not excessive); Coast Cities
Coaches v. Donat, supra note 92 ($45,000 not excessive for wrongful death of
six-year old). Contra, Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Jackson, 65 Fla. 393, 62 So. 210
(1913) ($30,000 for mental pain and suffering alone held excessive, where the
mother, the only person entitled to sue, could live but a few Nears).
97. 99 So. 2d 257 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
98. "Doctors speak of abortion as including all cases wherein pregnancy is
terminated before the time that a living child may possibly be anticipated. After
the twenty-eighth week, the process is spoken of as premature labor. With delivery
before this time, there is no likelihood of continued life. . . . Miscarriage is the
term more properly limited to between the sixteenth and twenty-eighth weeks
.... " 1 GRAY, AIrORNEYS' TrXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 58.02 (3d ed. 1961)
99. 99 So. 2d at 261.
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"In personal injury actions proof that the plaintiff's pain and
suffering resulted in and were aggravated by an abortion is
dearly admissible. So far as the abortion augments the physical
injury, pain or suffering, then so far is it proper to be considered
on the question of damages."
Clearly, a part of the mother's mental "pain or suffering" must
have been caused by the loss of her prospective child, even though
the court observed that she did not claim damages for the "loss of
the child which might have been born .... "100 In effect, the mother
would then be recovering for an invasion of prospective parenthood,
the very same damages that would be recognized under the Wrongful
Death of Minors Act. Conceptualistic distinctions may be drawn to
resolve this conflict, but these distinctions will be hard to apply when
separate actions are brought.
When this duplication of remedies is coupled with Florida's recognition of mental anguish as a separate tort, 10 ' even though the remedy
is limited to acts of malice, the possibility of three separate actions
with overlapping damages becomes apparent: (1) the parents could
sue for their "pain and suffering" under the Wrongful Death of
Minors Act, (2) the mother could sue in tort for her "pain or suffering" incident to the stillbirth or postnatal death and (3) the mother
could sue for her "mental anguish" caused by the loss of the child. The
General Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act make possible two
additional actions, bringing the grand total to five.
2. General Wrongful Death Act
Florida's purported codification of Lord Campbell's Act provides
02
in part:1
"Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be
caused by the wrongful act ... of any individual . . . and the
act . . . is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action . . .
and to recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every
such case the person or persons who ...would have been liable
in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action

100. Id. at 260.
101. E.g., Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Kimpler v. Riedel, 133
So. 2d 437 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). To date the recognition of mental anguish as
a separate tort has been severely restricted; however, it cannot be seriously doubted
that increasing advances of medical science in this area will have a pronounced
effect on this remedy.
102. FLA.

STAT.

§768.01 (1961).
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for damages
jured .. "

. .

notwithstanding the death of the person in-

The right to bring this action exists solely by virtue of the
statute; no such action was known at common law.1°3 The statute is
not a "survival" statute; statutory beneficiaries recover for their own
individual loss caused by the wrongful death.104 The injury is personal to the plaintiffs, and may be brought only when liability would
have existed in favor of the injured person had death not ensued.10
Only if Florida takes the position that prenatal injuries sound in
tort will liability exist under this statute. Thus, if, in an action under
the Florida Survival Act, the verdict was for the defendant, no action
10 6
could be maintained under the General Wrongful Death Act.
The courts of other jurisdictions have disagreed whether recovery
should be allowed in the stillbirth situation under general wrongful
death acts? 07 Logically it would seem that if recovery is to be allowed
by virtue of this act when the child dies subsequent to birth, it
should also be allowed for stillbirth, but any prediction as to the
position Florida might adopt would be purely conjectural.
Section 768.02 of Florida Statutes 1961, limits the right to bring an
action to certain classes in the following order: the surviving spouse,
the children, the dependents, and the personal representative. Only
one action is allowed and the first class in existence must bring it.sS
Damages are limited to those received by the person (s) bringing the
action,109 and no punitive damages are recoverable. 110
The situation becomes quite confused when one other than the
administrator brings the action. As the damages recoverable are
personal to the plaintiff, only that portion of the decedent's estate
that the plaintiff would have received during the decedent's lifetime
may be recovered.", A suit by one of the three preferred classes can
thus have unfortunate consequences. Because classes other than the
personal representative suing under section 768.01 can recover only a
portion of the estate, and because no part of the decedent's prospective estate can be recovered under section 45.11, the tortfeasor
escapes liability for the full loss resulting from his conduct. Such a
result would be unlikely in the prenatal area because the administra103. Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp., 144 Fla. 719, 198 So. 486 (1940).
104. Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So. 2(1 213 (1945); Florida E. Coast R%.
v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
105. Cline v. Powell, 141 Fla. 119, 192 So. 628 (1939).
106. Epps v. Railway Express Agency, 40 So. 2(1 131 (Fla. 19-49).
107. See notes 43 through 45 supra and accompanying text.
108. Love v. Hannah, 72 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1954).
109. IV. B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 731, 136 So. 557 (1931).
110. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, supra note 104.
111. Southern Util. Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366, 92 So. 683 (1922).
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tor ordinarily will bring the suit,11 2 the child normally having no surviving spouse, children or dependents prior to death.
The measure of damages that the administrator may recover is
the entire value of the decedent's prospective earnings and savings
113
that, but for death, could reasonably have been expected to accrue.
However, the administrator also has a cause of action under the
Florida Survival Act. Does this action affect his recovery under the
General Wrongful Death Act? Apparently not, for the supreme court
has held that two rights are violated by a wrongful death: the right of
the deceased to be secure in his person, and the right of his family
to support. 114 Thus, under section 768.01, the administrator recovers
for the injury to the estate of the deceased. However, the administrator can recover only the loss of prospective earnings and savings that
the deceased would have accrued after reaching majority;" z5 the
parents are allowed to recover for loss of services up to majority under
the Wrongful Death of Minors Act. The father may maintain one
action as parent and the other as administrator without making the
recovery double, because the damages in each instance are for different injuries.
3. Survival Act.
The administrator also may maintain an action to recover for
the immediate injury to the estate caused in the decedent's lifetime
under the survival provision."16 If substantial compensatory damages
are established, punitive damages are also available."17 Section 45.11
of Florida Statutes 1961, provides in part:
"No action for personal injuries ... shall die with the person,
and all actions shall survive and may be instituted, maintained,
prosecuted and defended in the name of the personal representative of the deceased . .. ."
However, when decedent's death is instantaneous, his administrator may not maintain a survival action since the decedent would
112. If death was not relatively early, causation may be impossible to establish.
Note that a wrongful death action carries a two-year statute of limitations. As to
the point at which the statute attaches, it has been held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until death, since "it was the intent of Section
95.11, F.S.A. to limit the commencement of the action from the time of the
accrual of plaintiff's cause and plaintiff's cause accrued on death." St. Francis
Hosp. Inc. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 456, 31 So. 2d 710, 711 (1947).
113. Marianna & Blountstown R.R. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553 (1922).
114. Ake v. Birnbaum, supra note 104.
115. Hooper Constr. Co. v. Drake, 73 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1954).
116. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955).
117. Fowlkes v. Sinnamon, 97 So. 2d 626 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
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incur no pain and suffering, recoverable expenses, or loss of earnings
prior to death. 118 The instantaneous death defense becomes particularly important in the stillbirth situation. If instantaneous death can
be established it will bar all recovery under the survival statute. Even
if instantaneous death cannot be established, at least in the stillbirth
case, damages would be minimal, if not nominal, for there would be no
loss of earnings prior to death, and little pain and suffering or recoverable expenses. As far as the expenses are concerned, the mother
would recover most of these in her own right.1"9
CONCLUSION

With the single exception of the Ephrem decision, the reported
cases in Florida reflect no consideration of the prenatal question.
Nonetheless, two points are apparent: it is only a matter of time until
the question is placed before our courts, and the existing law from
which a decision must be drawn may very easily lead to confusion
and illogical results. For these reasons, a detailed consideration of
the entire prenatal area is particularly important to avoid uncoordinated decisions on a case by case basis which could culminate in an
inescapable morass.
The preliminary determination in the consideration of any prenatal question is whether the jurisdiction will allow a tort action for
injury to the unborn child. This basic decision has not been made
by any Florida appellate court. However, an examination of the
course of events in other jurisdictions indicates a strong probability
for allowance of the action. In addition to the almost total collapse
of the historical impediments to recovery in other jurisdictions, analogous areas of Florida law strongly support the recognition of the
unborn child's rights and interests.
Once the initial question of recovery in a tort action is affirmatively answered, a further question remains as to the limits of this
right of action. The viability and conception rules represent the
dominant American holdings on this point. In an attempt to distinguish between biological life and human life, the viability rule
is without scientific support. At the time of its development it provided a very practical bridge to allowance of a remedy, but the reasons for its development have long since dissipated. This medical fact
is being regularly recognized in the current trend of decisions.
The prenatal question is even more complicated in the wrongful
death area. As a general rule, wrongful death actions are available
when the deceased would have had a cause of action had he survived. When the child dies before birth the jurisdictions that have
118.
119.

Beaven v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 100 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Fla. 1951).
See Ephrem v. Phillips, supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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considered the question are evenly divided in allowing and denying
recovery, the denial being based on the conditional liability rule.
On the other hand, recovery will generally be allowed when the child
survives birth and subsequently dies if the injury was received when
the child was viable. This is so even in the conditional liability
jurisdictions since liability is conditioned only upon birth and attaches at that point. If the injury were sustained in the previable
state, the current trend indicates the action will be allowed, although
there is no reported case directly in point. Furthermore, under Florida's unique Wrongful Death of Minors Act recovery might still be
possible, even in the absence of an affirmative allowance of a prenatal tort action, because of the "basic relationship" between the
parent and child recognized by the statute.
The situation in Florida is peculiarly confusing owing to the
existence of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act and the Ephrem decision, in addition to the usual Survival and General Wrongful Death
Acts. Potentially, five separate actions may accrue from a single
wrongful act, creating a very real possibility of multiple recovery.
Conceptually it may be possible to define the damages for each action
so that no overlapping occurs, but juries will experience extreme
difficulty in dealing with such formulae, especially when several
juries are involved and the issues are clouded by the emotions of the
case. The possibility of multiple recoveries is unwarranted and encourages the denial of a remedy when it should be allowed.
Every tortfeasor must answer for his wrongs, but, equally as important, liability must terminate at some point - to extend it indefinitely would result in excessive liability for a single wrongful
act. Because of the very real possibility of double damages in a Florida prenatal wrongful death case, the entire Florida scheme is badly
in need of revision. If the legislature refuses to act on the matter, as
it has on past occasions, the courts will be faced with the responsibility
of untangling the existing morass and of providing equal protection
for all the parties involved.
The analysis of Florida law suggests that several particular changes
need be forthcoming if prenatal actions are recognized. First, because
any wrongful death action may involve several actions, and consequently several statutes, a careful delineation of the damages recoverable under each of these provisions is needed. Although it may
seem a simple matter to define the limits of damages, juries often
experience extreme difficulty in dealing with such definitions, especially when several juries are involved, because of the multiplicity
of suits allowed.
Secondly, there appears to be a very distinct possibility of conflict between the Ephrem decision and the Wrongful Death of Minors
Act if both actions arise from a single prenatal injury. And once prePublished by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
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natal actions are allowed in Florida, it will be merely a matter of
time before this question is placed before our courts. Attempts to
distinguish the damages available under each theory would only increase an already muddied situation. Alternatively, to exclude the
Ephrem situation from the Wrongful Death of Minors Act would
be equally as impractical since it would preclude the father from a
remedy for his pain and suffering. Furthermore, one probable goal
of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act-protection of the "basic relationship" between parent and child-would be defeated by this
latter alternative.
A unique but not unreasonable solution would allow a single
action that embraces all the current theories. Such a solution would
retain the rights of all the parties involved, while curtailing the possibility of emotionally enlarged verdicts to unjust proportions. The
tortfeasor would be required to defend only one suit, witnesses would
testify but once, and the strain on the court calendar would be lessened. The interests of the father, mother, and administrator are so
closely identified that allocating the award should present little
difficulty. Unfortunately, such a solution would require legislative
action and recent sessions of the Florida legislature have not evidenced
any desire to untangle these problems.
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